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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation, et al.,
Def endants,

* * * * *

OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY,
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS &
REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS
COMPANY, a corporation, RICHARD
P. GARRICK, BOISE CASCADE
CORPORATION, d/b/a BESTWAY
BUILDING CENTER, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10516

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This intermediate appeal involves the relative
priorities of mechanic's lienors upon, and of a future
advance construction mortgagee to, Lot 10, Lazy Bar
Subdivision, an improved residential subdivision lot in
Salt Lake County.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Ten cases, including the "bellwether" (Civil No.
14 7326 below) in which this appeal is taken, involving
twelve improved residential lots in Lazy Bar Subdivision
in Salt Lake County were consolidated because of similarity of issues of fact and law. By its fifth supplemental
pretrial order, the trial court made certain rulings, of
which the following two are the subject of this intermediate appeal:
1. A ruling that the operative documents evidencing
the mortgage transaction between Western Mortgage
Loan Corporation and Cottonwood Construction Company provided for "obligatory" (or more properly, "nonvolitional") 1 advances and that such advances, and the
mortgagee's attorneys' fees and costs take priority as of
the time of recordation of the mortgage. (R. 133, 134)
2. A denial of the mechanic's lienors' motion for
partial summary judgment to the effect that certain work
constituted the "commencement to do work or furnish
materials on the ground for the structure or improvement" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated
38-1-5 ( 1953). (R. 133, 134)
1. The traditional phrasing of the point of law here involved is that, if
advances made under a prior mortgage are contractually "obligatory'', their
priority none-the-less attaches ~s o~ the,,rec;irdation of such mortg';lgi;, but
that - if future advances are 'opt10nal with the lender - the pnonty of
each such advance attaches as of the date of the advance itself, Anno., 80
A.L.R. 2d 179, 191. Appellants consider, however, that certain case authority is more readily understood. if the formula is couched in .somewhat different terminology, as follows: 1f advances made under a. p~1or mortgage are
contractually "non-volitional" with the len~er, their pnonty attaches <i;S of
the recordation of the mortgage, but 1f future advances are entirely
"volitional" with the lender - the priority of each such advance ;:tttaches
as of the date of the advance itself. The point is that the question is wheth~r
or not the lender's sole discretion is involved to any such advance. For this
reason, the "volitional" "non-volitional" terminology is utilized more
often than not herein.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek the following relief on intermediate
appeal:
1. A determination that the construction financing
transaction did not provide for obligatory (or, more
properly, "non-volitional") advances but that, on the
contrary, it provided for optional (or, more properly,
"volitional") advances which take priority only as of the
time of each such advance, or
2. Determination that, in any event, volitional expenditures made at the option of the mortgagee subsequent to the default of the borrower take priority only
as of he time of each such expenditure.
3. Remand with instructions to grant the mechanic's
lienors' motion for partial summary judgment to the
effect that the work evidenced by affidavits in support
of said motion constituted "commencement to do work
or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or
improvement" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated 38-1-5 (1953), thus establishing the priority date
for all mechanic's lien holders.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This is an intermediate appeal from interlocutory
rulings noted. Documents have been admitted in evidence. Depositions have been published. Admissions have
been made by pleadings or otherwise. Certain facts have
been developed by affidavits. No testimony yet has been
presented personally to the trier of fact.
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Some time prior to the beginning of 1960, probably
the latter part of 1959, the owners of an unimproved
tract of Salt Lake County realty decided to develop a
residential subdivision thereon. They entered into a contract with Harrison & Moore, a partnership, which
contract provided, in part, for sale of the land to the
partnership for $84,000 and further that the purchasers
would develop a subdivision or subdivisions on the land,
including platting of the land, installation of water mains,
grading and surfacing of roads, installation of curb and
gutter, and other improvements necessary under applicable ordinances. The agreement further provided for
payment for individual lots and the building of homes
thereon. The individual lots could be paid for by mortgages and notes subordinated to construction mortgages.
It was contemplated that they would be paid out when
the homes were sold. ( R. 163-168)
Harrison & Moore, in turn, contracted with James
A. Finnegan, Jr., and wife, in essentially the same terms
but at slightly higher prices. In addition, part of the
price to be paid by Finnegan was to go directly to the
surveyor for work done. Finnegans, in turn, assigned their
interest to Cottonwood Construction Company, a corporation, of which Finnegan was one of the principals.
(R. 169-1 77 )
Early in 1960 a subdivision plat was submitted to
the county officials. It contained 55 lots, and was known
as Lazy Bar subdivision. County approval was obtained
in the latter part of 1960.
Commencing in the latter part of 1959 and going
into approximately October of 1960, Charles V. King,
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licensed engineer and surveyor, surveyed the land, platted
it, placed visible stakes upon the ground marking the
lots, including Lot 10, thus defining the intended subdivision development. ( R. 69)
Following the surveying and platting, Lloyd Jackson
and Rex L. Jackson, contractors, installed the roads, curb
and gutter, sidewalks, water mains, sewer mains and
sewer laterals throughout most of the subdivision, including Lot 10. The lateral sewer line installed on Lot
10 terminated inside the lot itself by some three feet,
and in installing the sewer lateral the trench required
for it extended into the lot inside the platted lot line
approximately eleven feet. Installation of the sewer mains
and laterals was completed about January 1, 1961. Water
main installation was completed about August, 1962.
Roads, curb and gutter were commenced in 1961 and
completed in 1962. (R. 72-75)
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company
erected utility poles in the subdivision, including one on
Lot 10. The installation included ground anchors and the
stringing of telephone cables to serve Lot 10. (R. 80)
Following the foregoing work, short term future
advance construction financing on several of the lots in
the subdivision was obtained from plaintiff, Western
Mortgage Loan Corporation (hereinafter designated
Western), or United Savings and Loan Association, construction mortgagee in some of the companion cases.
(R. 152, pages 5, 6, 11)
Application for future advance construction financing on Lot 10 was made to Western. U pan approval by
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Westem's loan committee, documents evidencing the
transaction were prepared, dated all the same date, and
executed by the parties. (R. 152, page 8) The five
documents, dated October 29, 1962, used for the future
advance construction financing of Lot 10 were :

1. Note.
2. Mortgage.
3. Building and Loan Agreement and Assignment
of Account. (hereinafter designated Loan Agreement)
4. Release, Indemnity and Schedule A. (hereinafter
designated Schedule A)
5. Pre-construction Affidavit. (All these documents
are in R. 151, Exhibits W-2)
The note is in the face amount of $15,750.00. It is
secured by the mortgage which was recorded October 29,
1962, the date it bears.
The Loan
Schedule A.

Agreement

specifically

incorporates

Although the Loan Agreement provides that the
net proceeds of the loan shall be deposited in a special
non-interest bearing account, no such deposit was ever
made. In fact there was no segregation of funds from
the general funds of the lender and no funds were in
fact committed thereto in advance by the lender. (R.
82-3)

Schedule A provides, as here pertinent, for the disbursement of funds to be in the discretion of the lender,
contains provisions exculpating the lender from almost
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all liability otherwise usually incident to such a transaction, lists a schedule of fund advances but provides also
that changes in this schedule of advancements "as to
amounts and time of disbursement may be made at any
time by the [lender] as it may, in its sole discretion,
determine."
In the Pre-construction Affidavit, Finnegan and an
associate stated that no work has been started and no
materials furnished for Lot 10.
Of the five documents evidencing the transaction
between the lender and the borrower, only the mortgage,
which recites, contrary to the fact, that the full $15,750.00
had been received by the borrower, was placed on record.
The remaining four documents were not.
Western assigned its mortgage to First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A. as security. First Security Bank
of Utah, N.A. was brought into the case as an involuntary
defendant.
As shown by its ledger, Western attributed advances
to Lot 10 at frequent intervals from October 31, 1962,
to January 24, 1963. (R. 151, Exhibit W-84) At about
this time, Western, learning of purported misuse of funds
by the borrowers principals, refused further advances to
Cottonwood, thereby stopping work on Lot 10 and other
lots. (R. 152, page 18; R. 2)
Paragraph 10 of the unrecorded Loan Agreement
provided that upon default of the borrower, including
work stoppage by the lender under the terms of the
agreement, the lender could, at its option, ( 1) declare
all sums advanced immediately due and payable and be
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released from all further obligations to the borrower, or
( 2) take possession of the premises, finish improvements
and charge the costs thereof to the borrower to be secured
by the note and mortgage. (R. 151, Exhibits W-2) These
rights of the lender were cumulative and not to the
prejudice of any other rights under its mortgage.
Although the lender was at this stage relieved of any
obligation to advance further funds, it voluntarily and
without benefit of a receiver, took possession of the
premises and completed the improvements thereon,
charging all expenditures, costs and various miscellaneous
fees to the borrower. Then several months later it brought
this suit to foreclose, claiming all advances, both before
and after default to be secured by the mortgage and to
take priority as of the recording of the mortgage. (R. 152,
page 18; R. 151, Exhibits W-84)
Western had advanced $9,462.04, according to its
ledger sheet, at the time it caused stoppage of the work
and exercised its option to enter the premises and take
over the job. ( R. 151, Exhibits W-84)
Liens for unpaid materials were filed by Oscar E.
Chytraus Co. in the amount of $665.38 (R. 40); by
Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products Company in the
amount of $479.83 (R. 35); by Richard P. Garrick in
the amount of $283.46 (R. 45); and Boise Cascade
Corporation in the amount of $508.33 (R. 36); all for
sums due for materials furnished prior to Western's
exercise of its option.
Western's complaint prayed for $14,312.64 and
attorneys' fees and costs, ( R. 1 ) up to the time of the
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complaint. It also prayed for such additional sums as
might have been expended by it subsequent to the complaint. Exhibit W-84 shows a total of $16,43.5.47 attributed to Lot 10 as of January 8, 1965. Thus $6,973.43
of the amount prayed for by Western, not including
attorney's fees and costs attributable by it to this same
expenditure, represents expenditures or charges made by
Western subsequent to its exercise of its option to enter
the premises and take over the project.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT CONSTRUCTION FINANCING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION AND COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PROVIDED FOR NONVOLITIONAL ADVANCES AND THAT ALL SUCH
ADVANCES THEREFORE TOOK PRIORITY AS
OF THE TIME OF RECORDATION OF THE
MORTGAGE.
(A) INSTEAD, T H E C 0 N S T R U C T I 0 N
FINANCING ARRANGEMENT PROVIDED
FOR VOLITIONAL ADVANCES AND
THUS EACH ADVANCE MADE THEREUNDER TAKES PRIORITY ONLY AS OF
ITS DATE.
This point concerns a future advance construction
financing arrangement, the express written terms of
which are before the Court. We are not concerned with
construction financing in general nor with the various
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other types of arrangements which might be used for
construction financing. 2 It may be appropriately here
pointed out that no evidence was presented to the trial
court, nor is any before this Court, to the effect that the
written documents and their terms as here used are
typical or atypical of the documents and terms used in
the construction financing business. Moreover, no reported construction financing cases have been found
dealing with the specific language under scrutiny in this
Point.
The issue at hand is what the parties agreed to.
What may have been desirable or ordinary in <;uch an
agreement is not germane except to the extent that the
documents used might fairly accomplish such purpose by
their own terms - not by Sunday morning quarterbacking.
Nor should it be assumed that the mere fact that
construction was the purpose for which money was
borrowed dictates by some innate legerdemain the legal
consequences of the transaction, thus avoiding all recourse
to the terms of the agreement between the parties. 3
2. See Appendix A.
3. The mortgagee evidenced below understandable enthusiasm for the obiter
dictum in Micele v. Falduti, 101 N. J. Eq. 103, 137 At!. 92 (1927) to the
effect that " (a) ny building and loan mortgage advances are not optional"
in that "the building and loan is bound to make the advances." Although
the opinion does not enlighten as to the terms of the loan agreement therein,
if the New Jersey Court meant to suggest th~t ad:vances . a~reed by. the
parties to be discretionary would be held non-d1scret10nary 1f mserted m a
construction loan agreement, it was far wide of the mark. See Gray v. McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N. E. 1093 (1913) and Elmendorf-Anthony Co.
v. Dunn, 10 Wash. 2d 29, 116 P. 2d 253 (1941) for case decisions negativing this proposition. Also see Spradling, "Legal Hazards of Construction
Lending," 19 Business Lawyer 221 ( 1963) and "Th~ Open-End Mortgage
- Future Advances. A Survey," 5 De Paul Law Review 76, 78 ( 1955) for
scholarly articles which recognize that construction mortgage advances are
not immune from the "volitional - non-volitional" rule. When read in context in accord is Kratavil's chapter on "Mortgage Law" in the business
schC:Ol text, Pease and Kerwood, Mortgage Banking, ( 1965).
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The primary rules of law in the area here concerned
are well established. If a mortgagee is legally bound to
make advances, the fact that such advances might occur
subsequent in time to the recording of the mortgage does
not alter the priority of such advances - absent other
factors not here pertinent, such advances relate back to
the time of the recording of the mortgage. The reason
for this rule is sound. Where the lender is bound to make
the advances, he is unable to exercise discretion and being
so bound is a legal detriment to him just as though he
had already parted with the money. In legal contemplation, he is simply making deferred payments.
Typical of the cases expressing this line of authority
are: E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, 118 Cal.
App. 4 75, 5 P.2d 669 ( 1931), where the lender could
not of its own volition refuse advances, the advances being
tied to the progress of the work and an appraisal thereof;
Lampson Lumber Co. v. Chiarelli, 100 Conn. 301, 123
Atl. 909, 912 ( 1924), where there was a positive obligation to sell supplies to a party for use in the construction
of a certain building at current prices; and Boise Payette
Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47 Idaho 485, 276 Pac. 971,
972 ( 1929), where the mortgagee was bound by his
original agreement to make the advances specified.
The rule is otherwise where the lender may in its
own discretion refuse any or all such advances. Thus,
where the full amount of the purported loan is not paid
over to the borrower, but under the terms of the agreement the lender may, at its own volitition, refuse to make
future advances, any such advances take priority as to
intervening liens only as of the time of each such dis-
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bursement and do not relate back to the recordation of
the mortgage.
Disregarding occasional, varied statutory modification, not obtaining in Utah, the above rule is universally
applied to construction mortgages - as well as any other
type of mortgage. Superior Lumber Co. v. National Bank
of Commerce, 176 Ark. 300, 2 S.W'.2d 1093 ( 1928);
Community Lumber Co. v. California Puhl. Co., 215
Cal. 274, 10 P.2d 60 ( 1932) ; Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v.
Williams, 121 Cal. App. 571, 9 P.2d 324 (1932); W. P.
Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 2d 185, 191 Pac.
1027 (1920); Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 47 Atl.
327 ( 1900); Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47
Idaho 485, 276 Pac. 971 ( 1929) (dictum) ; Gray v. McClellan, supra; Finlayson v. Crooks, 4 7 Minn. 74, 49
N.W. 398 ( 1891); Garey v. Rufus Lillard Co., 196 Okla.
421, 165 P.2d 344 ( 1945) (where the mortgage contained no provision requiring mortgagee to make advances, advances were held to be separate transactions
inferior to intervening mechanics liens) ; Home Saving
& Loan Association v. Sullivan, 140 Okla. 300, 284 Pac.
30 ( 1929). Heller v. Gate City Building and Loan Assn.,
75 N.M. 596, 408 P.2d 753 ( 1965); Elmendorf-Anthony
Co. v. Dunn, supra. 4
In W. P. Fuller & Co., supra, all advances over a
certain amount were at the discretion of the lender.
His lien was held inferior to the liens of intervening
mechanics' lien claimants as to the advances he was not
obligated to make.
Although no Utah case squarely in point has been
found, Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham,
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12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 ( 1961) is persuasive
precedent for the proposition that this Court recognizes
the foregoing rules and specifically that discretionary
advances take priority only as of the time of each such
advance. In Mecham there was no agreement concerning
future advances, merely a mortgage regular on is face
for a sum certain. Under this set of facts, it was held
that the law implied an obligation consonant with the
terms of the mortgage and that, if the mony had not
been paid out, the lender was under an obligation to
pay it out according to the instructions of the borrower.
This Court said :
" . . . A mortgagee, who is loaning money to
a mortgagor-borrower, is obligated to pay out the
money in accordance with the directions of the
borrower. This is especially so where, as in the instant case, a sum certain is stated in the mortgage
and no provisions are made for future advances."
(Emphasis added)
The basis for the rule regarding the priority only
as of its own date of any discretionary advance rests
on sound legal principal. A mortgage is security for a
debt. Where there is a binding obligation to make an
advance it may be equated in law with an advance
already made, but where there is no such binding obliga4. The "volitional - non-volitional" rule is equally as applicable to ( 1) loan
agreements secured by a mortgage for a stated sum which, in fact, secu.res
future volitional advances up to that amount, as to ( 2). a loan tra~saction
secured by an "open end" mortgage for a stated sum, m fact received by
the mortgagor, plus open-end future advances. Gray. v: M cCl~llan! .supra,
involved the first type of arrangement. Far from restnctmg the voht10nal non-volitional" rule to "open end" mortgages, a leading article on the subjct Blackburn "Mortgages to Secure Future Advances," 21 Missouri Law
Re'view 209 213-215 ( 1956), lists the "open end" mortgage as merely .one
of four typ~s of secured transactions in which. tha.t rule m.ay come mto
play - another of which is the type of transaction mvolved m our case.
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tion the analogy fails and without a debt there is no
mortgage.
As a matter of fundamental fairness, no other conclusion is tenable. The law gives to a materialman or
laborer improving property at the owner's instance the
statutory right to look to the property for compensation
therefor if need be, subject only to prior valid rights in
the property. To make this right subject to subsequent,
discretional advances of a lender would completely
emasculate and nullify the legislatively established protection for the mechanic's lienor, for the lender could
with impunity advance or refuse to advance as it chose,
swallowing up, at its own volition, and for its own benefit,
the protection intended the mechanic's lienors.
The documents evidencing the transaction between
Western and Cottonwood demonstrate on their face that
Western here was not under a binding legal obligation
to make advances, but that such advances were completely within the sole discretion of Western and further
that, since Western was not liable for failure to make
advances, no legal requirement to make advances existed.
In determining the nature of the instant transaction
recourse to all the documents involved is required. Gary
v. McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N.E. 1093, 1094 (1913)
and Doran v. Britto, 52 R.I. 425, 161 Atl. 141 (1932)
hold that written agreements outside the mortgage may
properly show the transaction to be discretionary. In
fact, parol evidence would be admissible for this purpose. Frank E. Ewing Co. v. Krafft Co., 222 Md. 21,
158 A.2d 654, 659 (1960); W. P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 185, 191 Pac. 1027, 1030 ( 1920).
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Western's contemporaneously executed documents,
all of which were integral parts of the transaction may
be - in fact, must be - considered together in determining the legal effects of the transaction.
In addition to simultaneous execution, the operative
documents specifically refer to each other and specifically
incorporate each other into one integrated agreement.
That the mortgagee was not bound to make future
advances, but that making such future advances was
entirely discretionary with it is patent upon an examination of the agreements prepared by it and used by it.
The second unnumbered paragraph of the Loan
Agreement provides that the net proceeds of the loan
should not be given the borrower, but, on the contrary,
would be deposited in an account with the lender (which
was not done (R. 82-3)) and that such account was
assigned by the borrower to the lender as security for
itself. 5 That paragraph further provides:
"Each of the undersigned acknowledges that
he has no right to the moneys in the Account, other
than to have the same used by the Lender in accordance with this Agreement, which the Lender
agrees to do, upon its acceptance of this Agreement."
Paragraph 5 of the Loan Agreement provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this Agreement,
the Account shall be disbursed by the Lender from
time to time as the construction of the improvements progress in accordance with Schedule "A"
attached hereto, ... Such disbursements may .be
made to any of the undersigned, or, at the option
of the Lender, may be made to contractors, mate-
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rialmen and laborers, or any of them, for work
done or labor furnished in connection with such
improvements."
Schedule A, which also refers back to the Loan
Agreement, provides, in part:

"It is agreed that such disbursements are to
be made wholly within the discretion of the [lender J and we hereby release said [lender] from any
liability for any error of judgment or for any act
done or steps taken or omitted by it in good faith,
or based on any mistake of fact or law, or for anything it may do or refrain from doing in connection with such disbursements, excepting willful
misconduct of its employees, it being particularly
understood that said [lender] may take any action
in connection with such disbursements in reliance
upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt
or other paper or document believed by it to be
genuine and signed by the parties purporting to
have executed it. It is understood that such disbursements will be made by you in accordance with
"Schedule A" as follows:" (Then follows a schedule related to stages of construction.) (Emphasis
supplied)
In addition to the discretionary power and the
exculpatory immunity from liability provided by the
above paragraph, Schedule A effectively removes any
doubt as to the optional nature of the lender's advances
by specifically providing, immediately following the
schedule listing, that:
((Changes in the above ''Schedule A" as to
5. In fact no such separate account was Pstablished in the sense that moneys
were segr~gated out of the funds otherwise available to mo~tg.agee. The
bookkeeping "credit" to such account was, therefore, a mere fict10n.
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amounts. and time of disbursements may be made
at any time by the [lender] as it may, in its sole
discretion, determined." (Emphasis added)

Although the note and mortgage recite receipt of the
funds supposedly provided thereby, in fact, not one cent
had been disbursed, and under these broad provisions of
Schedule A, not one cent need be disbursed by the lender
should it, in its "sole discretion" determine not to so
disburse. Since the disbursements are relegated to the
"sole discretion" of the lender, no legal right inhered in
the borrower to compel disbursement and no legal penalty
could be imposed upon the lender if in its "whole" or
"sole" discretion it determined not to disburse.
For the following five reasons - each sufficient unto
itself - disbursements, from the very inception of the
financing arrangement, remained within the control of
the lender and were legally optional upon its part, and
in no sense obligatory:
1. Disbursements were wholly within the discretion
of the lender.
2. The borrower released the lender from contractual liability for anything it might do or fail to do
in this regard.
3. Disbursements were not made when the documents were executed and were not to be even expected
until certain stages of construction had been completed.
4. And even then, in its "sole discretion" the lender
could at any time alter the time when it would make
advances, and
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5. In addition thereto, in its "sole discretion" the
lender could alter at any time the amount of advances.
With the power to do all these things, and be relieved
from contract liability for so doing, the lender could not
be forced to disburse - ergo, disbursements, if and when
made, were in contemplation of law volitional or optional,
and while binding as between the parties, would take
priority as to intervening liens only as of the time of each
such disbursement.
A party to a contracl is bound by the words used.
This Court said in Valcarce v. Bitter, 12 Utah 2d 61,
362 P.2d 427, 428 ( 1961):
"(T)he court cannot fabricate the kind of
contract the parties ought to have made and enforce it."
Regardless of any protestation by one of the parties
to the instant contract that it was intended to provide for
nondiscretionary payments, the fact remains that it did
not.
The intentional use of the words "discretion" and
"sole discretion" obviate any possibility that the users
meant something else; particularly is this evident from
the setting in which the words are used. The entire purpose of the Schedule A is to increase the rights of the
lender, eliminate his liability and diminish the rights of
the borrower.
It is thus clear from the context in which used
that the phrases "wholly within the discretion" and "sole
discretion" in no manner signify "judicial discretion" but,
are intended to convey the meaning generally attributed
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to these words and phrases as here used, i.e., a sole or
entire power of decision.
Since "discretion" many have various meanings
analysis of its use and the words used to modifv it are
significant.
,
The adjective "sole" is variously defined by Webster's
Third New International Dictionary as ( 1) having no
spouse ... (2) having no companion ... (3) (a) having
no sharer. .. (b) of unmatched quality of kind ... ( 4)
functioning (as in acting, working, moving) independently and without assistance or interference ... ( 5) (a)
... that is such and no other ( 6) belonging, granted, or
atributed to the one person or group specified; independently accomplished, held or developed, exclusively
exercised, unshared. . . .
Thus modified, by "sole", which always denotes
exclusivity and as used in relation to the remainder of
the exculpatory and indemnifying provisions of Schedule
A, discretion is meant to convey its common meaning,
defined by Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "power of decision; individual judgment." The
example there given is "it is a matter that I cannot leave
to anyone's discretion - Upton Sinclair."
Similarly, "wholly" is defined by Webster as: ( 1) In
entriety; fully; as a whole without loss; as, to see a
situation wholly. (2) To the whole extent; totally; entirely; completely; thoroughly; as to be wholly at a loss;
wholly finished. ( 3) To the exclusion of other things;
solely.
In meaning, the phrase "wholly within the discre-
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tion" and the phrase "sole discretion" as used in the
instant documents are significantly similar to the expression "sole judge" used in Hell er v. Gate City Building and
Loan Association, 75 N.M. 596, 408 P.2d 753 ( 1965) a
case decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court within
the last few months. There the mortgagee had the right
to make needed repairs, and he was to be the "sole judge"
of the necessity for the repairs. Against the assertions of
the mortgagee that its advances so made should be
deemed non-volitional and prior to intervening liens, the
New Mexico Court said:
"The language of the above provision grants
appellant an option to make repairs. Appellant is
made
. the ,,sole judge as to the necessity of the repairs ....
The manner in which the term "discretion" is used
by those dealing in the mortgage area is also important,
thus in Blackburn, "Mortgages to Secure Future Advances," supra, at 214, we find:
"In the third type, the mortgage will also provide expressly for the making of future advances,
but the making of these advancements is strictly
within the discretion of the mortgagee. Such a device is termed a mortgage to secure 'optional future advances'." (Emphasis added)
and at page 223, the author says:
"Optional Advances. The final type of mortgage
to secure future advances is one wherein the mortgagee may make the advance solely at his option
or discretion."

In another factual setting, Davis v. General Foods
Corporation, 21 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) held that
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discretion to make payments meant a volitionary right to
disburse, or not, depending on the decision reached by
the holder of the power of discretion.
Statutes bestowing "discretion" have been interpreted as imparting free choice to its recipient. State v.
Pemiscot Land & Cooperage Co., 317 Mo. 41, 295 S.W.
78, 80 (1927). And in Rollins v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 390,
392 (8 Cir., 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 763 (1938) discretion in section 167 of the 1928 Internal Revenue Act
was interpreted as meaning a "power of choice."
Accordingly, given the power to determine if and
when and how much might be advanced, the lender had,
by definition, the power not to advance. Under the terms
of the agreement, Cottonwood would not have been able
to force Western to make advances were Western to
decide unilaterally, as it did when it heard rumors of
purported default, that it would not make advances but under the terms of the agreement Western could
have determined not to advance without fear of being
held liable therefor, without having heard rumors of
default.
SUMMARY
Western was the sole judge of whether to advance
or not. In its "whole" or "sole discretion," it could refuse
to advance funds, therefore any advances it did make
must in contemplation of law be volitional or optional
and take priority only as of the time of each such advance.
POINT I.
(B) AND IN ANY EVENT, PURSUANT TO THE
EXPRESS TERMS OF PARA GRAPH 10 OF
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ITS LOAN AGREEMENT THE LENDER
WAS RELEASED FROM ANY AND ALL
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, IF ANY
IT HAD, UPON DEFAULT OF THE BORROWER AND THUS THE VOLUNTARY
EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE LENDER
SUBSEQUENT TO SUCH DEFAULT TAKE
PRIORITY ONLY AS OF THE TIME OF
EACH SUCH ADVANCE OR EXPENDITURE.
The issue here under discussion is factually, completely independent of the previous discussion concerning
the volitional or non-volitional nature of the entire mortgage transaction. It rests not on the wording of Schedule
A, but upon paragraph 10 of the Loan Agreement, which
provides:
"Should [the borrower] default in the performance of any agreement hereunder; or should
work cease on the improvements, specifically including stoppage by the Lender under the terms of
this Agreement, or for any reason whatsoever, for
( 15) calendar days; or if the improvements shall
be damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty;
or in the case of death of any of the undersigned;
or if a petition in bankruptcy or under any debtor's
relief law shall be filed by or against any of the
undersigned; . . . ; [or lien filed against the premises, etc,] then in any such events, at its option,
the Lender may, without notice:
(a) declare all indebtedness secured by
the mortgage immediately due and payable
and withdraw all sums in the Account and
credit the same in such a manner as it elects
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upon the indebtedness due the Lender, and
thereupon the Lender shall be released from
all obligations to the undersigned under this
Agreement, or
( b) take possession of the premises and
let contracts for or proceed with the finishing
of the improvements and pay the cost thereof
out of the funds in the Account; should such
cost amount to more than the balance of the
Account, then such additional costs may be
expended at its option by the Lender and they
shall be secured by the mortgage as hereinafter specified.
The rights and remedies of the Lender are cumulative and the exercise of any such rights shall not
operate to waive or cure any default existing under
the mortgage or note, nor to invalidate any Notice
of Default or any act done pursuant to such notice
and shall not prejudice any rights of the Lender
under the Mortgage."
The plain, simple effect of paragraph 10 of the Loan
Agreement, upon its coming into play, is to end any
legal obligation, if any existed, of the Lender to the
borrower. That this is so is elemental. The proposition
that when one has discretion to do or not do something
he is not legally bound to do it is axiomatic, requiring
no citation of authority. However, the authorities cited
in Point I (A) dealing with future volitional advances
are here pertinent.
It follows then that, subsequent in time to the
instance when the lender is relieved of any obligation to
make advances, if any existed, and such advances or
expenditures are therefore at his discretion, any such
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advances or expenditures take priority, as against intervening liens, only as of the time of each such advance.
Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, supra, involved,
in the part here pertinent, an almost identical fact situation and therefore may shed light upon rules and
reasons for them. The question was there phrased by the
Washington Supreme Court as:

" ... When a mortgage, given to secure advances for the construction of a dwelling house,
provides that in case of abandonment by the mortgagor before completion, for a period of fifteen
days, the mortgagee may, at its option, enter upon
the premises and complete the construction and
add the sums so expended to the principal amount
provided for in the note and secured by the mortgage, and thereafter the mortgagor executes and
delivers to another a second mortgage on the same
property for a pre-existing debt, and then abandons construction before the house is completed,
and the first mortgagee, with actual knowledge of
the second mortgage, enters upon the premises and
makes certain expenditures deemed by it necessary
to complete construction, is the first mortgagee
entitled to priority over the lien of the second mortgagee for the total sum advanced, including the
sum expended on the property after abandonment
and notice of the second mortgage?" (Emphasis in
original)
In Elmendorf-Anthony, the first mortgagee had
entered and completed construction under a provision
in its agreement with the borrower identical in effect
with the agreement in paragraph 10 of the instant Loan
Agreement: " ... and in the event of abandonment of
work upon the construction of the said building or build-

25
ings for a period of fifteen days as aforesaid, the mortgagee may, at its option, also enter into and upon the
mortgaged premises and complete the construction of
the said building . . . and monies so expended . . . shall
be added to the principal amount of said note and secured
by these presents . . . . "
It was held that money expended to put the house
in saleable condition upon the abandonment by the
borrower was volitional in nature and that the intervening
mortgage had priority over such advances. This rule was
applied without distinction to sums within the stated
limit of the first note and mortgage and to sums in
excess thereof.
Relative to the weight of authority in this regard,
the Court said, at 256:

" .... If there were any substantial diversity
of opinion in the decisions of our sister states, we
would be inclined to view the rights of the first
mortgagee relative to advances made pursuant to
an optional clause in a construction contract, even
after notice of a junior encumbrance, as superior
to such junior encumbrance. But as we read the
cases cited by appellant, not one has reached that
result, and our own efforts to locate such authority
has proved unavailing, with the possible exception
of First National Bank v. Zook, 50 N.D. 423, 196
N.W. 507." (Emphasis added)
In the instant controversy, there has been no showing
that the property would not have been ample security
for the amount of the then existing indebtedness to the
lender at the time of default and stoppage of work, not
that, as indicated in Elmendorf-Anthony Co., such in-
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formation is likely to be material. Nor is there any showing that the large sums voluntarily expended by the lender
to complete the home and put it into rentable or saleable
condition were necessary or even desirable to preserve
the status of its lien pending foreclosure.
The lender, under its right as against the borrower
in the Loan Agreement, preempted the venture on Lot
10 when it was about half finished. R. 151, Exhibit W-84,
the ledger sheet of Western for Lot 10 shows that as of
January 24, 1963, approximately $9,462.04 had been
attributed to this lot by the lender. Subsequent entries
are after the lender learned of alleged default, refused
further funds to the builders, took possession itself, and
completed the home under the optional provision of
paragraph 10 of the Loan Agreement.
Such assumption of Cottonwood's venture was not
even needed - for at this intermediate stage, the lender
was protected by the buffer afforded by the land value.
Its mortgage was contractually prior to the purchase
money mortgage involved. By waiting and taking over
the venture, expending more money for building and
other miscellaneous purposes, and charging interest on
all money expended, the lender undertook to enhance its
own position at the expense of already disadvantaged
lienors. This the law should not, and does not, allow.
Legislative mandate attaches the lienors priority at this
point in time. This cannot be whittled away or brushed
under the carpet by self-serving assertions that the property is enhanced by the lender's activities, for any such
enhancement then would merely innure to the benefit of
the lender, with interest, service charges, etc.
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A similar situation was encountered in Heller v. Gate
City Building and Loan Association, supra. There the
mortgagee under a right to do so given by the mortgage
made advances for needed repairs, as to which he was
to be the sole judge as to necessity. The Court held that
such advances were within the universal rule as to
volitional future advances and thus inferior to intervening
rights.

SUMMARY
The happening of the event chosen by it to have
such effect, relieved Western of any contractual liability
or obligation whatsoever to Cottonwood - assuming it
had any in the first place. Expenditures thereafter cannot
rob the lienors of their rightful priority. Expenditures
thereafter take priority, if any, only as of the date of
making of each such expenditure.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF ITS AMENDED
FIFTH SUPPLEMENTAL PRETRIAL ORDER
THAT THE FACTS SUBMITTED BY THE AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE
"COMMENCEMENT TO DO WORK OR FURNISH MATERIALS ON THE GROUND FOR THE
STRUCTURE OR IMPROVEMENT" WITHIN
THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
38-1-5 ( 1953).
The basic issue before the Court relating to this
point is simply whether or not the priority of the
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mechanic's lienors relates back to the time of performance
of the work and improvements described in the Affidavits of Lloyd Jackson, Charles V. King and Durwed
Cook, relating to Lot 10, Lazy Bar Subdivision. Briefly
summarized, the facts material to this point are as follows:
The first labor performed upon Lot 10, Lazy Bar
Subdivision, was the surveying and staking work done
by the engineering firm of Coon, King & Knowlton
(hereinafter "Coon, et al."), commenced in late 1959
and completed about October 1, 1960. Between January
1, 1961, and the end of 1962, sewer and water mains
were installed in the street adjacent to Lot 10, and a
lateral sewer line was installed upon Lot 10; the adjacent
street was graded and completed; and the curb, gutter
and sidewalk upon Lot 10 were completed. All of this
work was done by Lloyd and Rex L. Jackson (hereinafter
"Jacksons"). During the installation of the sewer and
water mains, the sewer lateral and the sidewalk, curb
and gutter, and the completion of the road, Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Company (hereinafter
"Telephone Company") erected poles and ground
anchors and strung telephone cables to serve Lot 10.
Respondent's mortgage covering Lot 10 was executed, delivered and recorded on October 29, 1962, after
all of the above described labor was performed upon
and all of the above described materials were furnished
to or for the benefit of, Lot 10.
'
Lienor Oscar E. Chytraus Company, Inc. performed
labor upon and furnished materials to, and for the benefit
of, Lot 10, commencing on or about January 17, 1963,
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and ending on or about January 18, 1963; lienor Gibbons
and Reed Concrete Products Company furnished materials to Lot 10, on or about November 17, 1962; lienor
Richard P. Garrick performed labor upon and furnished
materials to Lot 10 commencing on or about October 1,
6
1962, and ending on or about January 9, 1963; and the
lienor, Boise Cascade Corporation furnished materials
to Lot 10 commencing on or about November 12 1962
'
'
and ending on or about January 16, 1963. Said defendants
are hereinafter designated "lienors".
Defendants submit that under these facts, their liens
are entitled to the same priority as the liens possessed by
Coon, et al., Jacksons and the Telephone Company.
RELEVANT STATUTES
The following provisions of the Utah Code are
relevant to a determination of the above stated issue:

---

Section 38-1-3. "Contractors, subcontractors and
all persons performing labor upon, or furnishing
materials to be used in, the construction or alteration of, or addition to, or repair of, any building,
structure or improvement upon land; all foundry
men and boiler makers; all persons performing labor or furnishing materials for the construction,
repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory
or hoisting works; all persons who shall do work or
furnish materials for the prospecting, development,
preservation or working of any min.ing clai~, mine,
quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specific~tions,
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or supennten-

6. This commencement date has been controverted by the mortgagee and
cannot be assumed for purposes of this appeal.
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dence, or who have rendered other like professional
services, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon
the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of services rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any
other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall attach only
to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim,
mine or deposit, whether working under bond or
otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated while the
same remain upon the premises included within
the lease."
Section 38-1-4. "The liens granted by this chapter
shall extend to and cover so much of the land
whereof such building, structure or improvement
shall be made as may be necessary for the convenient use and occupation thereof ... "
Section 38-1-5. "The liens herein provided for shall
relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of
the commencement to do work or furnish materials
on the ground for the structure or improvement,
and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or
other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun,
or first material furnished on the ground; also over
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which
th lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or first
material furnished on the ground."
Section 38-1-10. "The liens for work and labor
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done or material furnished as provided in this
chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice and claim of lien
and regardless of the time of performing such
work and labor or furnishing such material."
DISCUSSION
Section 38-1-3, quoted above, establishes beyond
question that Coon, et al., the engineers who prepared
the subdivision plat and surveyed the lots, streets, curbs,
gutters and sidewalks, that the Telephone Company, the
concern which erected the utility poles and strung the
telephone cables, and that the Jacksons, who installed the
sewer mains and laterals, the water mains, the streets,
the curbs and gutters, and the sidewalks, each acquired
liens upon Lot 10. See Backus v. H oaten, 4 Utah 2d 364,
294 P.2d 703 ( 1956); King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln
Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962); Headlund v.
Daniels, 50 Utah 381, 167 Pac. 1170 ( 1917); see also
Nolte v. Smith, 11 Cal. Rptr. 261, 87 A.L.R. 2d 996
( 1961); Annotation, 87 A.L.R. 2d 1004, entitled
"Mechanic's lien for services in connection with subdividing lands"; Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver
Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 Pac. 254 (1909); Badger
Lumber Co. v. Marion Water Supply Co., 48 Kan. 182,
29 Pac. 476 ( 1892); Beatty v. Parker, 141 Mass. 523,
6 N.E. 754 (1886); and O'Harra v. Frazier, 54 So. 2d
688 (Fla. 1951). Indeed, Section 38-1-3, by its terms,
establishes clearly that even the engineers who furnished
the plats and surveyed the property acquired a lien upon
Lot 10. Section 38-1-3, is equally clear in establishing
that the Jacksons and the Telephone Company acquired
liens.
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The record establishes with equal clarity that the
mechanic lienors had and have liens for the labor and
materials furnished by them to Lot 10. The provisions of
the Utah Code further establish unequivocally the time
as of which said liens have priority and said provisions
do not make their priority dependent on whether or not
the labor and materials relating to the liens were furnished prior to the execution, delivery and/or recording
of the mortgages of the plaintiff. Section 38-1-10 provides
that all liens created by the stature are on an equal footing regardless of the date of filing of the notice of lien
and regardless of the time of performing the work or
furnishing materials giving rise to the lien. Section 38-1-5
provides that all liens created by the statute relate back
to and take effect as of "the time of the commencement
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the
structure or improvement."
In short, it is clear from the statute that Coon, et al.,
the Telephone Company, the Jacksons and the mechanic's
lienors, each had a lien upon Lot 10. It is equally clear
from the statute that each of these liens under the statute
is on an equal footing. Finally, the statute also makes
clear that each of these liens became effective as of the
time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials by any potential lienor on the particular lot to which
such liens relate. Squarely in point is United States Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n. v. Midvale Home Finance Corp., 86 Utah
506, 44 P.2d 1090, 1093-94 ( 1935). See also Teahen v.
Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 Pac. 764 ( 1890); Morrison v.
Carey-Lombard Co., 9 Utah 70, 33 Pac. 238 ( 1893);
Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 Pac. 363 ( 1906);
also Culmer v. Caine, 22 Utah 216, 61 Pac. 1008 ( 1909);

}
(
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Fields v. Daisy Gold Mine Co., 25 Utah 76, 69 Pac. 528
( 1902); Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87
Pac. 713 ( 1906) .

Paragraph 4 of the Fifth Supplemental Pretrial
Order, wherein the trial court denied the Motion for
Summary Judgment of Chytraus does not reveal the
theory upon which the trial court reached its conclusion.
It does not appear that the trial court directly considered
the impact of the Utah statutes relied upon herein as
quoted and discussed hereinabove.
It may be that the trial court concluded that the
labor and materials furnished by Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone Company were not furnished for
the same improvement as were the materials furnished
by the mechanic's lienors. If this is the basis for the
ruling of the trial court, it is erroneous on two grounds.
First, as a matter of fact, the labor and materials furnished by Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone
Company were furnished for the same improvement as
were the materials furnished by the mechanic's lienors.
It is plain, and undisputed, that the defendant Cottonwood Construction Company, and its predecessors in
interest, conceived, planned and carried out the development of the Lazy Bar Subdivision as a unified and
integrated project. That is, Cottonwood Construction
Company and its predecessors in interest subdivided the
land and undertook to construct dwellings upon the
lots in the subdivision for sale to the public. Thus, the
surveying of the lots, the installation of sewer and water
mains in the streets, the grading and completion of the
streets, the installation of the curb, gutter and sidewalk
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upon Lot 10, and the installation of the sewer lateral
upon Lot 10, together with the erection of utility poles
and stringing of cables, were all a part of the improvement of a residential dwelling lot for sale to the public.
The labor and materials subsequently furnished by the
mechanic's lienors and used in connection with Lot 10
for the further improvement of that lot for sale to the
public were furnished for the same improvement as were
the labor and materials furnished by Coon, et al., the
Jacksons and the Telephone Company. See Park City
Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., supra; King
Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., supra; Badger Lumber
Co. v. Marion Water Supply Co., supra; and Beatty v.
Parker, supra.
The apparent conclusion of the trial court is also
erroneous as a matter of law. There is absolutely no
provision of the Utah statutes relating to mechanic's liens
that provides for a different priority of mechanic's liens
depending upon the particular aspects of the improvement to which the several mechanic's lienholders furnished material or labor. Indeed, any such differentation
would be intolerable, for the result would be that the
priorities of persons who furnish labor or materials would
be different if, for example, they furnished labor and
materials for the sidewalk as opposed to the driveway,
for a separate garage as opposed to the house itself, for
a retaining wall as opposed to a fence, for a sewer line
as opposed to a water line, and for a telephone line as
opposed to a power line. Such distinctions would make
a mockery of the plain legislative intent that all persons
furnishing labor or materials for the improvement of
land are entitled to liens which have equal priority,
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taking effect as of the date of commencement of the
labor or furnishing of materials. This legislative intent
is made clear beyond doubt by Section 38-1-10, which
provides that:
"The liens for work or labor done or material furnished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an
equal footing, regardless of the date of filing the
notice and claim of lien and regardless of the time
of performing such work and labor or furnishing
such material."
This provision is not limited to liens for work and
labor done for, or material furnished to, the same
aspect of the contemplated improvement as the trial
court apparently concluded. The provision relates to all
liens, "provided in this chapter." The priority of all such
liens is provided in Section 38-1-5 to be the time of the
commencement to do work or furnish materials upon the
ground for the structure upon or the improvement of
the land. See Teahen v. Nelson, supra, Morrison v. CareyLombard Co., supra, and Sanford v. Kunkel, supra. In
Sanford this Court phrased the rule as follows:
"Under the statute, the lien had its inception from
the time of the commencement of the work and
the furnishing of material, and by relation, takes
effect after that date, and is given priority over
any lien or encumbrance subsequently interven. ... "
mg
SUMMARY
The issue presented for decision under this point is
easily resolved. It is clear that the performance of labor
upon and the furnishing of materials to Lot 10 commenced long before the execution, delivery and recording
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of the mortgages of respondent. The statutes do not require that such labor or materials be furnished to the
same particular building or structure. Even if the statute
did require that, for the mechanic lienors to share the
priority of Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone
Company, the labor performed and materials furnished
be related to the same particular aspect of the improvement, this would be satisfied in this ca<;e. The
sidewalks, curb and gutter installed upon the surface of
Lot 10 had utility only in connection with a dwelling.
The sewer lateral installed below the surface of Lot 10,
for a distance inside the line, could only be for connection
to the dwelling house constructed upon Lot 10. The utility
poles erected and cables strung by the Telephone Company had utility only when connected to the dwelling
house constructed. Obviously, the labor and materials
furnished by the lienors had utility only in connection
with such dwelling house.
Section 38-1-3 accords to each of the parties who
performed such work and furnished such materials a
mechanic's lien upon Lot 10. Sections 38-1-4 and 38-1-10
dictate that all mechanic's liens upon Lot 10 shall be upon
an equal footing, and Section 38-1-5 expressly provides
that the priority of all such liens relates back to and takes
effect as of the performance of the first labor or the
furnishing of the first materials giving rise to the lien
senior among the group of liens.
Thus, the liens of the mechanic's lienors upon Lot 10
are of equal priority and stand with the liens of Coon,
et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone Company. The
liens of Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone
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Company are admittedly prior to the liens of the
mortgage of respondent. Inasmuch as the liens of the
mechanic's lienors are by the express provisions of the
statute, upon an equal footing and of an equal priority
with the liens of Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the
Telephone Company, their priority over the liens of the
mortgage of respondent is equally clear.
It is respectfully submitted that the record and the
applicable law establish the priority of the mechanic's
liens of the appellants over the liens of the mortgage of
respondent, and thereby establish that the trial court
erred in denying the Motion for Summary Judgment and
in holding, in connection with such denial, that the liens
of the mechanic's lienors are not prior and superior to
the liens of the mortgage of respondent.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein ,appellants respectfully
pray that this Court reverse the trial court's interlocutory
order appealed from in the following particulars:
1. By determining that the construction financing
transaction did not provide for obligatory (or more
properly, "non-volitional") advances but that, on the
contrary, it provided for optional (or more properly,
"volitional") advances which take priority only as of the
time of each such advance, or
2. By determining that, in any event, volitional expenditures made at the option of the mortgagee subsequent to the default of the borrower take priority only
as of the time of each such expenditure.
3. And, in any event, remand with instructions to
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grant the mechanic's lienors' motion for partial summary
judgment to the effect that the work evidenced by
affidavits in support of said motion constituted "commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground
for the structure or improvement" within the meaning
of section 38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, ( 1953).
Respectfully submitted,
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APPENDIX A
Will a decision favorable to the mechanic's
lienors on this appeal preclude construction
financing in Utah?

Always implicit, and often explicit, in litigation of
this type is the question of whether a decision contrary
to the construction lender - no matter how justified
upon legal principles - will lead to the withdrawal of
construction financing from Utah.
The table below affords the answer to the inquiry.
Each of our sister states listed afforded construction
lenders in 1964 much less favorable priority treatment
than that advocated by the appellants herein. Yet each
issued more new unit permits per capita than did Utah.
What the table demonstrates is that the prosperity
of a given state's construction industry depends upon
economic, more than legal, factors. Adjustments to legal
requirements have always been, and can always be, made
by lenders of any type, including construction lenders.
If a Colorado construction lender could, in 1964, adjust
to absolute mechanic's lien priority through careful disbursal of funds, a Utah construction lender can, as easily,
either provide such a disbursal or utilize non-volititional
paper. Equally, the lender can assure that labor has not
been done or material has not arrived on the site prior
to recordation of the mortgage.
There are other states, e.g. Alabama, with both
stricter laws and a lower ratio of new permits per capita
than Utah. They do not derogate from the point just
made, however, but rather reinforce it, for they again
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illustrate the complete non-relationship between new
construction and reasonable legal safeguards against
construction lender abuse.

PRIORITIES AND NEW UNIT PERMITS, 1964
State
Colorado

Missouri

Oregon

Virginia

Utah

Legal Situation

New Unit1
Permits

Population2

Permits
Per
Capita

16,985

1,966,000

1: 116

35, 711

4,409,000

1:123

15,655

1,871,000

1:120

37,680

4,378,000

1: 116

6,160

992,000

1:161

Absolute lienholder
priority, Darien v.
Hudson, 134 Colo. 213,
302 P. 2d 519 (1956)
Absolute lienholder
priority as to building, etc., which purchaser on execution
has right to remove
within reasonable time.
Missouri Rev. St.
§429.050 ( 1959)
Absolute lienholder
priority as to improvement, which purchaser
on execution has right
to remove within
reasonable time.
Oregon Rev. St.
§§87.010, 87.025
( 1963 Rep. part)
Lienholder prior as to
improvement; prior
lien entitled only to
value of land on foreclosure. Virginia
Code §43-21 (1950)

1. New Unit Permits figures were obtained by cumulating statistics in U. S.
Bureau of Census, Construction Reports - Building Permtis, Housing
Authorized in Individual Permit-Issuing Places: 1964. Table 1.
2. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1965, page 11.

